A Problem For Stoics: Why Virtue Needs an End Goal

Why Won't Stoics Admit They Want to Be Happy?

Imagine you're taking a road trip with your Stoic friend. You ask, "Where are we going?" Your friend answers, "Well, if we drive to Houston then we will arrive in Houston. But that's not important. Being in Houston is merely a byproduct of driving to Houston."

You blink. Something feels off about this response. Your friend seems unwilling to admit a simple truth: she's driving to Houston because she wants to go to Houston. You might start questioning her motives. Is she being evasive? Is there something she's not telling you? Is she hiding something from herself?

Yet this same logical structure appears in Stoic ethics, and here we rarely question it: "If we engage in virtuous action, then we will of course be more tranquil and happy. But that's not important. Being tranquil is merely a byproduct of virtuous action." 

The bad faith evident in the Houston example somehow becomes invisible when discussing virtue and happiness. Why do Stoics insist that the natural end of virtuous action – happiness and tranquility – is merely incidental to their pursuit of virtue?

The Natural Relationship Between Means and Ends

As Epicureans, we see a straightforward relationship between our actions and their aims. We seek pleasure and avoid pain because this is fundamental to human nature. More specifically, we pursue virtue and wisdom because they lead to ataraxia – that state of tranquility and happiness that constitutes the highest pleasure. This framework is simple and practical because it is honest. It acknowledges our natural motivations while showing how refined pleasures and virtuous living create sustainable happiness.

The Stoic position, in contrast, demands a peculiar psychological gymnastics. They must maintain that virtue is pursued purely for its own sake, while simultaneously acknowledging that it leads to happiness and tranquility. This creates a circular logic: Why pursue virtue? Because it's virtuous. But why is it virtuous? Because pursuing it for its own sake is virtuous.

This circularity becomes even more apparent when we consider practical decision-making. An Epicurean can straightforwardly evaluate whether an action will lead to greater tranquility. A Stoic must somehow make decisions while pretending not to care about their outcomes. This is not only psychologically unrealistic but potentially paralyzing.

"But Virtue Is Its Own Reward"

The Stoic may respond that we're misunderstanding their position. They might argue that virtue itself is inherently fulfilling, like creating art for art's sake or loving someone purely for who they are. They warn that viewing virtue instrumentally – as a mere means to happiness – could lead us to abandon virtue when it becomes inconvenient.

They might point to examples where acting virtuously directly leads to unhappiness, arguing that true contentment comes precisely from detaching ourselves from outcomes. Only by focusing purely on virtuous action, they claim, can we achieve genuine tranquility in the end, even if it requires some temporary unhappiness to get there.

These are sophisticated arguments, but they ultimately fail to resolve the core problem. Even art for art's sake is created for the joy of creation. We love others purely because deep connection fulfills a fundamental human need.

Moreover, these are psychological states recognizable to all of us. What does virtue feel like? Careful, because if you say it feels “good” you’re on a slippery slope to admitting what you’re actually after. Conversely, if it doesn’t feel like anything, how does it qualify as a state of being? 

The Stoic position demands that we deny the natural relationships between actions and their ends, creating an artificial separation between virtue and its positive outcomes.

Moreover, their warning about instrumental virtue leading to abandonment misunderstands the Epicurean position. We don't see virtue as merely instrumental – we see it as necessarily connected to happiness. Just as you can't separate the warmth of a fire from the fire itself, you can't separate virtue from its role in creating a happy life.

A More Sophisticated Defense

A thoughtful Stoic might offer a more nuanced position. Virtue, they would argue, isn't merely good because it's virtuous - it represents alignment with reason and the natural order. When we exercise virtue, we're not just following arbitrary rules but participating in rational action. This gives virtue an inherent value beyond its consequences.

The doctrine of preferred indifferents adds sophistication to what might otherwise seem like simple denial. Stoics don't truly ignore outcomes - they acknowledge that health, wealth, and pleasure are "preferred." But they argue these are merely raw materials for exercising virtue rather than goods in themselves. This suggests a more complex relationship with outcomes than outright rejection.

They might point out how focusing on process rather than outcomes reduces anxiety. When we detach from results we can't control, we're free to act more effectively. A general focused purely on wise strategy rather than victory might make better decisions. A parent focused on loving well rather than outcomes might raise healthier children.

History offers examples of Stoic effectiveness. Their focus on duty and process rather than outcomes has helped leaders, philosophers, and ordinary people maintain equilibrium in chaos. From their perspective, this effectiveness stems precisely from their refusal to make happiness the aim.

The Problem Remains

While Epicureans value freedom from anxiety just as much as Stoics, this defense doesn't resolve the fundamental issue our Houston example reveals. Consider how strange it would sound if our friend elaborated her position:

"I'm not driving to Houston because I want to reach Houston. I'm driving to Houston to align myself with rational action and the natural order of driving. Houston is merely preferred, a raw material for exercising proper driving."

The Stoic framework takes straightforward human aims - like wanting to reach a destination, or wanting to be happy - and subordinates them to abstract concepts like rational alignment or virtue for its own sake.

When Stoics argue that focusing on process reduces anxiety, they make a valid point about attachment. But their solution goes beyond mere mindfulness of process. They demand we pretend our natural aims aren't really our aims at all. This creates a kind of philosophical sleight-of-hand where actual human goals must be disguised as mere "preferred indifferents" in service of abstract virtue.

The Epicurean position offers a more direct path. We can acknowledge our real aims while still being mindful of process. We can say "I want to reach Houston, so I'll drive carefully and well" without pretending the destination is merely incidental to proper driving. Similarly, we can pursue virtue because it leads to happiness without diminishing either virtue or happiness in the process.

This transparency about ends and means reduces rather than increases anxiety. There's no need to maintain the psychologically strained position that we don't really care about outcomes. We can simply acknowledge our natural desires while pursuing them wisely and virtuously.

Finding Common Ground

Both Epicureans and Stoics seek human flourishing. We agree that virtue is crucial for a good life, though we differ on whether it's an end in itself or a means to happiness. The Stoic emphasis on detachment from outcomes offers valuable insight into how attachment can create suffering.

The Epicurean contribution lies in psychological honesty. By acknowledging that humans naturally seek pleasure and avoid pain, we build ethics on a sustainable foundation. This doesn't reduce virtue to mere expedience - it recognizes that virtue and happiness are naturally connected.

Perhaps synthesis lies in seeing virtue and happiness as necessarily linked, like health and well-being. They're distinct but inseparable. Virtue naturally produces happiness not as an external reward but as its organic fulfillment.

The Road Trip Revisited

A more honest dialogue might look like this:

"Where are we going?"

"To Houston. The journey matters deeply - how we travel, the choices we make along the way. But yes, I chose Houston because I believe going there will be worthwhile."

This acknowledges both the goal and the importance of how we pursue it. Having destinations doesn't diminish the significance of how we travel toward them.

The examined life requires honest examination of our motivations. Neither pure instrumentalism nor pure devotion to abstract virtue captures the full complexity of human ethical experience. We need frameworks that honor both our nature as pleasure-seeking beings and our capacity for reason and virtue.

As Epicureans, we can appreciate Stoic insights while maintaining that pleasure - properly understood as tranquility and freedom from disturbance - remains the ultimate end. This doesn't reduce virtue to mere means but recognizes the natural harmony between virtuous living and human happiness.

Ειρήνη και Ασφάλεια

Peace and Safety