Is Virtue Better Than Pleasure?

A Response to Alastair MacIntyre

How do we meaningfully compare the pleasure of swimming in a lake with that of eating a fine meal? 

In After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre presents a compelling critique of Epicurean ethics that centers on the problem of comparing different kinds of pleasure. The experiences of swimming and eating are so fundamentally different in quality that any attempt to rank or maximize them seems impossible. 

This critique appears devastating to hedonistic ethical frameworks that rely on pleasure as their fundamental value. However, a careful examination reveals that this same criticism, when followed to its logical conclusion, undermines MacIntyre's preferred Aristotelian framework even more thoroughly.

The Incommensurability Problem

Which pleasure is best and how can we choose? The pleasures of intellectual discovery, physical exertion, artistic appreciation, and sensual enjoyment seem to exist in entirely different domains. They differ not just in intensity but in kind, making any attempt at comparison seem like comparing the weight of a stone to the brightness of a star. MacIntyre's critique strikes at the heart of hedonistic ethics. If we cannot compare different kinds of pleasures, how can we make ethical decisions based on maximizing pleasure?

This problem appears particularly acute when we try to make practical ethical decisions. If we must choose between activities that produce different kinds of pleasure, how can we decide? We might initially respond that we should seek to maximize pleasure, but without a common metric for comparison, this mandate becomes meaningless. How can we maximize what we cannot measure?

However, this critique misses a crucial distinction in Epicurean thought. Rather than seeking to maximize pleasure in an absolute sense, Epicureanism might better be understood as seeking sufficiency in pleasure through the achievement of ataraxia (tranquility). Under this interpretation, we need not directly compare different pleasures; instead, we can ask whether each activity contributes meaningfully to a state of tranquility. This shifts the framework from one of maximization to one of sufficiency and balance.

MacIntyre's Aristotelian Alternative

Believing that we cannot maximize pleasure in any meaningful sense, MacIntyre moves on to an alternative schema of ethics. In response to what he sees as the failures of modern moral philosophy, including hedonism, MacIntyre advocates for a return to Aristotelian virtue ethics. 

In this framework, the focus shifts from pleasure to excellence in human activity. Rather than asking what brings pleasure, we ask what constitutes excellence in human function. Virtues, in this view, are those characteristics that enable human flourishing within social practices and traditions.

MacIntyre argues that virtues provide universal standards for ethical behavior that avoid the problems of comparing different kinds of pleasure. Courage, justice, wisdom, and temperance represent excellences that can be understood and practiced across different activities and contexts. These virtues, he contends, emerge from the requirements of human social life and the development of practices over time.

The Cultural Contingency of Virtue

However, MacIntyre's Aristotelian alternative faces even more serious problems than the hedonistic framework it seeks to refute. While he claims that virtues represent universal excellences, anthropological evidence suggests that conceptions of virtue vary dramatically across cultures. What counts as wisdom in one society might be seen as foolishness in another; what one culture views as courage, another might see as reckless aggression.

Consider, for example, how "wisdom" might be understood in different contexts. In a traditional tribal society, wisdom might primarily consist of knowledge of ancestral stories and local ecological relationships. In classical Athens, wisdom might have meant philosophical sophistication and political acumen. In contemporary society, wisdom might be associated with technological understanding and global awareness. These are not merely different expressions of the same underlying virtue; they represent fundamentally different conceptions of what constitutes excellence.

Moreover, the very idea of "excellence" becomes problematic when we examine it closely. Excellence cannot be defined except in relation to some goal or purpose. But what determines these goals? MacIntyre might argue that they emerge from social practices and traditions, but this merely pushes the problem back a step. Different societies develop different practices and traditions, leading to different conceptions of excellence. The universality that virtue ethics claims to provide dissolves into cultural relativism.

The Epicurean Advantage

The very problem that MacIntyre identifies in hedonistic ethics—the incommensurability of different experiences—actually points toward the strength of the Epicurean framework rather than its weakness. 

While it's true that we cannot directly compare different kinds of pleasure, pleasure and pain themselves represent universal human experiences that transcend cultural boundaries. Every human society recognizes and responds to these basic experiential states, making them more suitable foundations for ethical discourse than abstract virtues.

Consider how this plays out in practice. While we might struggle to compare the pleasure of swimming to that of eating directly, we can recognize that both activities contribute to human well-being and can be evaluated based on their contribution to ataraxia. This provides a more concrete and universal framework than trying to determine whether an action exhibits "excellence" or "virtue" in some abstract sense. The experience of tranquility, while it may manifest differently across cultures, remains recognizable and meaningful across human societies.

Moreover, the Epicurean framework better accommodates the reality of human decision-making. When people make choices, they often do so based on their assessment of how those choices will affect their well-being and that of others. They don't typically consult an abstract standard of excellence but rather consider the concrete impacts on happiness, satisfaction, and peace of mind. This suggests that pleasure and pain, broadly understood, provide more practical guides for ethical behavior than virtue.

Beyond Cultural Relativism

One might object that this appeal to pleasure and pain simply trades one form of relativism for another, as different cultures might still interpret and value these experiences differently. 

However, this misses a crucial distinction. While the specific sources of pleasure and pain may vary across cultures, the basic experiences themselves remain constant. We can meaningfully discuss and compare experiences of well-being and suffering across cultural boundaries in a way that we cannot with abstract virtues.

This has important implications for cross-cultural ethical dialogue. While we might struggle to agree on what constitutes "courage" or "wisdom," we can more readily find common ground in discussions of what promotes human flourishing and what causes suffering. This provides a more promising foundation for developing ethical frameworks that can bridge cultural differences.

Conclusion

MacIntyre's critique of hedonistic ethics in After Virtue, while insightful, ultimately reveals the advantages of an Epicurean framework rather than its limitations. While it's true that different pleasures cannot be directly compared or measured against each other, this same problem applies even more forcefully to the virtues that MacIntyre advocates. The Epicurean focus on pleasure, pain, and tranquility provides a more universal and practical foundation for ethical reasoning than abstract virtues.

This suggests that rather than returning to Aristotelian virtue ethics, we might do better to develop a more sophisticated understanding of how pleasure and pain, broadly conceived, can guide ethical behavior. 

While we may not be able to create a precise calculus of pleasure, we can recognize its role in human flourishing and use it as a guide for ethical decision-making. This approach, grounded in universal human experiences rather than culturally specific conceptions of excellence, offers a more promising path forward for ethical theory.

The incommensurability of different pleasures, rather than being a fatal flaw in hedonistic ethics, might actually point us toward a more nuanced and practical approach to ethical reasoning—one that acknowledges the complexity of human experience while still providing meaningful guidance for action. In this light, MacIntyre's critique serves not to undermine hedonistic ethics but to help us better understand its strengths and possibilities.

Ειρήνη και Ασφάλεια

Peace and Safety